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ABSTRACT
The purpose of the article is to establish and theoretically justify
a new “constitutional mindset” for a direct application of
constitutional human rights in the private sector, based on moral
arguments that are reinforced and illustrated by today’s democratic
and social reality. Generally, constitutional human rights are
viewed as part of public law and are to be applied in private law
through the indirect application model; however, this doctrine has
proven to be limited, implicit, and unsystematic. According to our
view, moral ideals at the heart of a democratic regime hold the basis
for individual direct reliance on constitutional human rights,
regardless of whether the breaching entity is a government,
corporation, or individual.
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Moreover, the necessity of implementing the direct application
model is increasingly evident in light of today’s reality, in which
non-governmental bodies have acquired unprecedented economic
and social power and influence. In light of this change, comparative
and international discourse has increased the responsibility of the
private sector to uphold constitutional human rights principles
accordingly. The direct application model, as advocated in this
article and that can be implied by the 2011 UN Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights, suggests that states should
expressively and actively address the governance gap of
constitutional human rights in order to provide incentive for
corporations to abide human rights obligations; this will provide
tangible remedies for those injured by these violations and
consequently uphold key democratic principles that define modern
society.
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1. INTRODUCTION
“Where, after all, do universal rights begin? In small
places, close to home . . . Yet they are the world of the
individual person . . . Unless these rights have meaning
there, they have little meaning anywhere.”
Eleanor Roosevelt (U.N., New York, March 27, 1958)
This article discusses the direct application of constitutional
human rights in the realm of private law. Generally, constitutional
rights are viewed as part of public law and are applied in private
law through the indirect application model, which has proven to be
limited, implicit, and unsystematic. According to our view, the basis
for individual direct reliance on constitutional human rights is
democratic ideals, regardless of whether the identity of the
breaching entity is a government, corporation, or individual. For
example, if three individuals, who were protesting in silence and
bearing signs outside the President’s home were removed by
civilians who effectively prevented the protesters from
implementing their right to demonstrate. Were the demonstrators’
constitutional rights (including freedom of expression and freedom
to demonstrate) infringed on by their fellow civilians? Or does the
fact that they were civilians and not police officers or other
government officials prevent them from making this claim?
Alternatively,
what
about
an
individual
privately
communicating with a friend through e-mail regarding recent
relationship issues with their spouse and the next day an unrelated
site provides an advertisement for a divorce attorney. Can this
violation of privacy and human dignity throughout the Internet be
ignored when committed by private corporations, which today can
be larger and more powerful than some countries? Are the
principles purportedly underlying arrangements for the protection
of privacy and human dignity throughout the Internet in a
democratic state meant to distinguish between corporations and the
Ministry of Interior?
The approach that we present and defend negates the crucial
role ascribed to the distinction between violations of citizens’
constitutional rights according to the identity of the infringing
party—i.e., a police officer and a bystander or a government
ministry and a private business enterprise. We hold that clinging to
this traditional distinction has the potential to harm democracy’s
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basic principles or violate an individual’s rights. We argue that the
basis of democracy is a uniform set of principles compelling
effective protection from any violation of the elemental liberties at
the foundation of citizens’ constitutional rights, whether by
authorities, another citizen, corporation, or entity. We argue for the
direct application approach; that the constitutional set of rights and
balancing principles at the core of the democratic regime should be
applied directly in both public and private contexts. This claim
gains significance in light of the increasing economic and social
significance of corporations and an increasingly vocal international
discourse supporting imposing human rights on business
corporations.1
Traditionally, the law has perceived constitutional human rights
as a barrier protecting individuals from the state’s “omnipotent”
power—to somewhat ease the power imbalance between
individuals and the government. In this sense, human rights were
perceived as a part of public law. Due to this traditional starting
point, discourse on human rights in private law has been lacking,
and unsystematic, even though private law has also discussed
human rights in one way or another, but without using the specific
language of rights.2 Accordingly, the basic question touching on
what is the most effective way to implement human rights in
individual relationships has remained unanswered and
controversial.3
Comparative law shows that the usual way of implementing
human rights in private law relies on an “indirect” application
model, in which human rights fall below constitutional laws and are
“equal” to ordinary legislation or common law. They apply in
individual relationships, but indirectly, through legal techniques
1
See generally Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General, Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations
‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31, annex (Jun.
16, 2011) [hereinafter UN Guiding Principles] (presenting the guiding principles of
state duty and corporate responsibility to protect human rights and their access to
a remedy).
2 See generally DANIEL F RIEDMANN & DAPHNE B ARAK -E REZ, H UMAN RIGHTS
IN P RIVATE LAW (2001), (the introduction to human rights in private law).
3 See ROBERT A LEXY, A THEORY OF C ONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 354 (Julian Rivers
tr., 2002), (discussing the construction of horizontal effect).
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with roots in private law (such as the interpretation of private law—
including its safety-valve concepts—and the filling of lacuna
through the case law) that serve as channels to incorporate specific
components of constitutional rights.4
The “direct” application of human rights in individual
relationships, which is the familiar public law approach concerning
government authorities, is not generally implemented—even
though some constitutions (e.g., South Africa and Greece) formally
enable it,5 and trends of judicial activism in Germany, Canada, and
the United States have broadened it to include individual human
rights.
The main purpose of the current article is to theoretically justify
and establish the discourse on the direct application of human rights
in the private sector, while challenging notable criticism. We hold,
contrary to the prevalent view, that human rights must be applied
directly and explicitly also in private law. We aim to provide an
alternative “constitutional mindset” to the prevailing legal approach
of the indirect application model, based on moral arguments that are
reinforced and illustrated by today’s democratic and social reality in
which corporations have acquired unprecedented economic and
social power and influence.
Part One opens with a philosophical and theoretical discussion
of the democratic regime’s fundamental principles and of the
warranted conclusions concerning the general status of basic
liberties and basic rights generally set in the constitution and
considers the differences between the direct and indirect application
models of human rights in private law. Part Two discusses
normative justifications as well as developments in the legal and
public discourse on corporate law and human rights, while
emphasizing the importance and effectiveness of adapting the direct
application model in private law specifically in today’s corporate
4 See Mattias Kumm & Víctor Ferreres Comella, What Is So Special About
Constitutional Rights in Private Litigation? A Comparative Analysis of the Function of
State Action Requirements and Indirect Horizontal Effect, in THE CONSTITUTION IN
PRIVATE RELATIONS: EXPANDING CONSTITUTIONALISM 265 (András Sajó & Renáta
Uitz eds., 2005) (a comparative analysis of the function of state action requirements
and indirect horizontal effect); for a review of the various approaches, see AHARON
BARAK, ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ELIKA BARAK-USSOSKIN 363, 368–378 (Steven Adler et.
al. eds., 2012) [Heb]; see also Aharon Barak, Constitution Human Rights and Private
Law, 3698 YALE L. SCHOOL FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP SERIES, 218, 220 (1996), (presenting
models for the application of constitutional human rights in private law).
5 See H UMAN RIGHTS AND THE P RIVATE S PHERE : A C OMPARATIVE S TUDY 158–
159 (Dawn Oliver et.al. eds., 2007) (analyzing Greek legal theory on interpersonal
effect of constitutional rights).
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reality and international discourse. Finally, the article explains how
international initiatives, led by the UN 2011 Guiding Principles
provide further support for the direct application model and the
importance of its use in the modern corporate structure of society.
2. DIRECT APPLICATION MODEL
2.1. Democracy, Human Rights, and Law
As we claim, and is discussed herein, the direct application
model rests on the essence of the democratic regime and views the
basic principles of democracy as moral principles. We will therefore
briefly describe the view of the democratic regime that underlies this
article6 to provide a theoretical justification for the use of the direct
application model in a modern democracy.7 We first present the
central ideas of this view, which is within the philosophical tradition
of the social contract, and then place it within the context of the
philosophical theories dealing with just arrangements in a state’s
civil society.
A democratic regime is viewed as a solution to a specific
problem, so that every important component of it is part of this
solution. The understanding of the democratic regime’s essence
thus begins with an acknowledgement of the problem that this
regime is meant to solve.
The human situation creates the problem of interpersonal
conflicts. People have values and beliefs, wishes and ways of life
suited to their tastes; however, the realization of all personal desires
is impossible because they inherently clash with one another,
causing interpersonal conflicts.
These interpersonal conflicts
between individuals challenge democratic regimes to provide
6 See AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 23–26 (2006) (defining the
concept of democracy and its essence); see also ASA KASHER, A Jewish and Democratic
State: A Philosophical Outline, in A MAN’S SPIRIT: FOUR GATES, 12–17 (2000) [Heb].
7
A discussion in depth of the difference between formal and essential
democracy has no place in the current context, and we will confine ourselves to the
character of democratic regimes known to us. All known democratic regimes,
without exception, depart from the formal characterization and take on essential
features. A historical explanation for the character of a given democratic regime
may be possible in terms of a formal democracy and its appendices, but the product
of the historical developments, as it appears clearly before us, is a regime of
essential democracy. Our approach here characterizes this essence.
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arrangements that enable individuals to live side by side without
strife. The democratic regime deals with this challenge by creating
fair arrangements that guide citizen behavior when in conflict. Fair
arrangements will always preserve human dignity while guiding
citizens on how to live together despite their fundamental
differences and conflicts. Therefore, the preservation of human
dignity through fair arrangements lies at the core of the essential (as
opposed to the formalistic) democratic regime. Fair arrangements
that preserve human dignity compel society to respect everyone’s
dignity and refrain from violating it.
To fathom the essence of democracy, the following two ideas
must be clearly understood: human dignity8 and fair arrangements
for its protection. We use fairness as did John Rawls in his thought
on justice as fairness; the requirements of fairness can be described
in terms of the well-known “veil of ignorance,”9 and are considered
moral requirements because they are justified in terms of demands
about the protection of human dignity.
When coming to the conclusion that a democratic regime
requires preserving human dignity in all circumstances, it will also
make this demand when seeking to limit basic liberties that are
mutually conflicting. A regime that is protective of human dignity
will also impose limitations on basic liberties when they impede on
human dignity. For example, both freedom of movement and
freedom of property are basic liberties. Protecting them is part of
protecting human dignity. Freedom of movement is limited insofar
as it violates freedom of property, but democracies will not limit
freedom of movement on the basis on one’s desire to block
“undesirables” from the public area that they live since no one has a
basic freedom to exclude other people from the public realm.
The current conception of the democratic regime is part of the
cluster of theories—beginning with Thomas Hobbes, John Locke,
8 See generally IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS CH 2., (1964) (discussing the notion of protecting the person’s human
dignity or, in its traditional formulation, protecting the dignity of the person created
in God’s image, which rests on four principles).
9 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, A RESTATEMENT 15, 18 (Erin Kelly
ed., 2001) (defining the original position, where parties are not allowed to know the
social positions or the particular comprehensive doctrines of the persons they
represent).
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Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and up to John Rawls in the
present10—who have endorsed the social contract approach.11
Generally, a theory endorsing the social contract approach rests on
the notion that social arrangements have compelling moral validity
insofar as they can be justified as plausible results of a potential
agreement. In the present context, we focus only on the agreement’s
contents.12
We follow Rawls: the theory’s contents are supposed to include
principles of justice to establish and review the “basic structure” that
determines, inter alia, the manner the main social institutions ascribe

10 For a general, up-to-date and comprehensive review, including a broad
bibliography and further comparison to traditional social contract principles, see
Fred D’Agostino, Gerald Gaus & John Thrasher, Contemporary Approaches to the
Social Contract, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (May 30. 2017),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractarianism-contemporary/
[https://perma.cc/EF8D-NJAC], (showing that the social contract theories of
Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau rely on the idea of consent).
11 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Noel Malcolm ed., Clarendon Press, 2012)
(1651); JEAN HAMPTON, HOBBES AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT TRADITION (1988); Sharon
A. Lloyd & Susanne Sreedhar, Hobbes’s Moral and Political Philosophy, STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Apr. 30, 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hobbesmoral/#Bib [https://perma.cc/NN8W-R98W]; JOHN LOCKE & PETER LASLETT, TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1967) (1689); Alex Tuckness,
Locke’s Political Philosophy, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Jan. 11, 2016),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-political/ [https://perma.cc/WN9VBRM5]; Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (G.D.H. Cole trans.,
Prometheus 1988) (1762); DAVID LAY WILLIAMS, ROUSSEAU’S SOCIAL CONTRACT : AN
INTRODUCTION (2014); Christopher Bertram, Jean Jacques Rousseau, STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
PHIL.
(May
26,
2017)
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rousseau/
[https://perma.cc/957E-YR7B];
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Lara Denis ed., Mary Gregor trans.,
Cambridge U. Press 2017) (1797); Frederick Rauscher, Kant’s Social and Political
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
PHIL.
(Sept.
1,
2016),
Philosophy,
STANFORD
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-social-political/
[https://perma.cc/C9HH-VBK4].
12
Authors of philosophical theories endorsing the social contract approach at
times also endorse an elaborate position on the components of the democratic
regime. In the present context, however, we will deal only with the moral principle
underlying this regime rather than with all its components. On Rawls’ conception
of democracy, see, e.g., Joshua Cohen, For a Democratic Society, in THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO RAWLS, 86–138 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003); see also Amy Gutmann,
Rawls on the Relationship between Liberalism and Democracy, in THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO RAWLS, 168–199 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003), (discussing the
relationship between Liberalism and Democracy in theory).
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basic rights and duties.13 Indeed, the agreement presented in Rawls’
theory includes the first principle of justice, formulated as follows:
“each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme
of basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for
others,”14 or in a later formulation: “[e]ach person has the same
indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties,
which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for
all.”15
We believe that a prominent feature of each of these basic
liberties is that people are meant to enjoy their liberties, as they are,
without any disruption by authorities, corporations, or by any of its
citizens or inhabitants. Our approach is compatible with Rawls’
view concerning social contracts and does not derive from Rawls’
views on the establishment and enforcement of the agreement.16 His
positions on these issues do not necessarily derive from his stance
on the principles of justice and, therefore, we do not deal with them
in this article. The first principle of justice does not support an
understanding of citizens’ basic liberties as limited to the
relationship between the citizen and government institutions.
Insofar as a state is supposed to act according to the first principle of
justice (among all others), it is expected to justify arrangements that
entail deviations from the general character of the protection of basic
liberties from all objections. Arrangements protecting these liberties
only from objections by government authorities require a
justification compatible with the first principle of justice. The
position formulated in this article is meant to prevent deviations of
this kind. Similarly, insofar as the constitution of a state is meant to
convey the principles at the foundation of its regime, among them
the first principle of justice, its constitution is meant to establish
arrangements that do not significantly deviate from the general
character of the protection of basic liberties from all objections.
13 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, 258 (1996) (discussing why the basic
structure is taken as the first subject of justice).
14 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 53 (1999) (arguing that “these
principles apply . . . to the basic structure of society and govern the assignment of
rights and duties and regulate the distribution of social and economic
advantages.”).
15 See RAWLS, supra note 9, at 42.
16 See generally RAWLS, supra note 14.
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We are not negating a significant nor real difference between the
state and each of its citizens; both must respect the human dignity
of every citizen and both must refrain from any violation of citizens’
basic liberties, which is unjustifiable. Nevertheless, as noted,
whereas the state has duties touching on the foundation of these
basic liberties and on the enforcement of the arrangements involving
them, the individual citizen has no such duty. Cautiously refraining
from harming another is considerably different from institutionally
enforcing this caution.
We have outlined the general fundamental conception of a
democratic regime’s essence17 and will now add several conclusions
about the principle of direct application as well as some further
clarifications.
First, let us return to the two examples that opened this article.
According to the approach presented so far, both of them involve a
violation of the basic rights of citizens—freedom of expression and
freedom to demonstrate in one, and the breach of personal emails in
the other. However, a similar violation could have been committed
by a state agency or a local authority, for us, the violation is the same.
Their grievance should not be altered due to the identification of the
infringing party.
According to the conventional approach, an event involving
police officers disturbing a legal demonstration will be handled in
the context of public law, based on considerations of infringement
of basic civil rights. By contrast, a disturbance to the same legal
demonstration by citizens who do not hold a government position
will be handled in a private law context, based on other
considerations. According to our approach, even if we maintain the
distinction between public and private law for general reasons
unrelated to our concern here, we will still say that considerations
regarding the infringement of basic civil rights must play a part,
even when the event is handled in a private law context.
To simplify, let us consider a specific case of two people holding
one of the demonstrators to prevent the event—a police officer
pulling his right arm and a private citizen pulling his left arm. Both
are inflicting the same injury on him and, according to our approach,
it is unjustified to discuss the actions of the private citizen in terms
different from those used to discuss the officer’s action, insofar as
17
A discussion in depth of the difference between formal and essential
democracy has no place in the current context, however this article relates to
democracies with essential features; see, e.g., BARAK, supra note 6, at 23–26.
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the actual disturbance of the demonstration is the same. We could
discuss other aspects of the police officer’s behavior, such as the
breach of her duty to protect the demonstrator, incumbent on her by
virtue of her role but not on the citizen who fulfills no such role. Our
concern here is another aspect of the police officer’s behavior—the
very disturbance of the demonstration.
Our first systemic claim concerning private law, is that
considerations touching on the infringement of basic civil rights
should be allowed to emerge, even though the state and its
authorities played no part in the infringement under discussion.
Arguments resting on such considerations may be directed against
an individual or a corporation and not only against an authority but
also against the legislature, insofar as it seems to have failed in
enacting effective sub-constitutional legislation to protect an
individual from harm by an individual or a corporation. Such
arguments may also be directed against the executive branch if it has
failed to provide suitable protection to the individual against harm
by an individual or a corporation, according to the relevant
legislation.
Another systemic claim that emerges from the approach
proposed here is one that also lowers the barriers between public
and private law. A democratic state is not confined to pointing out
civil liberties only in the basic realms of life, but can hold civil
liberties in equal standing to basic rights. By its very nature, such a
right enables two justified demands. First, the right to free
expression within permitted borders makes room for one citizen’s
justified demand from another, whoever the other might be, to
refrain from preventing free expression within permitted borders.
This demand is justified by the very nature of the democratic regime.
Second, the right to free expression within permitted borders makes
room for a justified demand by citizens to protect their possibility of
implementing this right against anyone seeking to prevent them
from doing so as they see fit. This demand is justified so long as it
is addressed to those whom, according to state arrangements, are
entrusted with the responsibility and the required authority to
protect citizens from others seeking to disrupt the implementation
of their rights. In a democratic state, entrust state authorities are
entrusted (such as the police) with this responsibility and the power
required to exercise it.
According to the approach proposed, the state is intended to be
involved in protecting citizens from any infringement of their
liberties of implementing a basic right in the context of both public
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and private law. The state should protect citizens demonstrating
legally from anyone seeking to prevent them from doing so. There
is indeed a difference between situations handled by public law and
those handled by private law. In the former, the state is meant to
refrain from disturbance, from using the power available to it to
prevent citizens from implementing their basic right; in the latter,
the state is supposed to intervene to protect citizens from anyone
seeking to prevent them from realizing such a basic right. This is a
significant difference, both conceptually and practically, but does it
justify the accepted pattern of setting up a barrier separating public
from private law with regard to the subjugation of private actors to
constitutional human rights?
Arrangements protecting citizens are required conceptually,
rather than on the basis of actual power differences or on other social
grounds.18 Civil rights in a modern democratic state are no longer a
defense mechanism for citizens from government authorities but
have become a necessary component of the regime, without which
the state may lose its characterization as an essential democracy
because it no longer meets the ethical requirements of protecting
human dignity, particularly in situations of conflict.
Civil rights are usually viewed as moral rights, with a pre-legal
standing whose special role is to justify the imposition of duties on
others.19 In a way, constitutional rights translate the moral duty to
honor basic moral rights into a set of legal rules, relying on an agreed
recognition of the duty to honor moral norms.20 It merits noting that
18 See generally JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 1–2 (1990)
(suggesting that we would have many of the rights provided by our current legal
system even if that system did not assign them to us); Larry Alexander, Judicial
Review and Moral Rights, 33 QUEEN’S L. J. 1, 3 (2007) (purporting that while both law
and morality tell us what we are obligated, permitted, and forbidden to do, “[m]oral
reasons are the highest authority in deciding what we should do.”).
19 See generally JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986) (offering a
“liberal foundation for a political morality.”).
20 See generally John Oberdiek, Lost in Moral Space: On the Infringing/Violating
Distinction and Its Place in the Theory of Rights, 23 L. & PHIL. 325 (2004) (arguing
against the “moral conception space of rights” and against incorporating the
“infringing/violating distinction into a theory of rights”); John Oberdiek, Specifying
Rights Out of Necessity, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 127 (2008) (arguing for a specified,
rather than general, conception of rights); John Oberdiek, What’s Wrong with
Infringements (Insofar as Infringements Are Not Wrong): A Reply, 27 L. & PHIL. 293
(2008) (rebutting the argument that “the category of rights infringement is secure.”).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

432

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 40:2

moral norms touching on basic human and civil rights do not
differentiate between infringements by people, by a corporation, or
by a government authority due to the classification of these moral
norms as part of the individual’s duty under the social contract not
to infringe their fellow-man’s fundamental civil rights.21
The approach here suggests constitutional expression of this
basic principle, not only insofar as civil rights are at risk of violation
by government authorities but also in all other circumstances, when
the risk is posed by the acts of an individual, a corporation, or an
entity that is not a government. Indirect application arrangements
challenge the implementation of this principle, requiring special
justification: why should the protection of citizens from
infringement of their basic rights enjoy constitutional standing when
they are endangered by government authorities, but subconstitutional standing when endangered by citizens, corporations,
or non-government entities?
However, we hold that rights are the same rights, the harm is the
same harm, the protection must be equally effective and cannot be
private. We return to these questions below by moving on to a
broader and more detailed comparison between the direct and
indirect application models, from several perspectives.
2.2. Between the Direct Application Model and the Indirect
Application Model
Recent trends show that basic human rights are a factor not only
to be considered in individuals and government relationships,22 but
also in relationships between one another.23 In several places in the
21
Supreme Court of Israel sitting as Court of Appeal: Civil Appeal 294/91,
Hevra Kadisha [Burial Society] of the Jerusalem Community v. Lionel Aryeh Kastenbaum
P.D. 46(2) 464 [30/4/1992, Heb.].
22 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS IN P RIVATE LAW (Daniel Friedman & Daphne BarakErez, eds., 2001) (explaining how human rights originated as rights and freedoms
vis-á-vis the State and other public authorities).
23 See, e.g., Kumm & Ferreres Comella, supra note 4, at 265 (suggesting that
even though a constitution is addressed to public authorities rather than
individuals’ private law is not precluded from being subjected to substantive
constitutional standards in private litigation).
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world, the accepted view is that human rights law is indirectly
applied to private law.24 Similarly, according to the direct
application model, a court must base its decision on constitutional
rights. The reason is that the parties have rights and duties toward
one another and not only toward courts.25
But in a deep and fundamental sense, as is clarified below, the
difference between the models is not merely semantics. In this
context, it is worth differentiating between the models at two levels:
one of principles and arguments and another of practical results. At
the level of principles, the difference lies in the definition of the
citizen’s constitutional rights in terms of infringement of a specific
liberty. In this instance, the infringing party’s identity is irrelevant.
At this level, arguments concerning infringements of a liberty will
be based on the direct application of constitutional rights. Insofar as
practical results are concerned, no differences between the models
will be found in the vast majority of cases.
Differences between the models are also found at the
declaratory-educational and implementation levels, particularly in
the current constitutional situation when courts are less willing to
grant human rights protection in private law in the absence of
specific legislation or of a valve concept. The German legal system,
for example, imposed a positive duty on the legislature to create
protections for human rights in private law.26 These moves stress
the inaccessibility and inevitable difficulty in protecting human
rights using the indirect application model, whereas the direct
application model can offer legal systems a more lucid and
seemingly simpler methodology. The indirect application model, as
noted, also splits human rights into two sets within one single legal
system, and thereby not dealing consistently with the general
question concerning the dosage of human rights and the balance
between them when they clash, a topic discussed in the next section.
Indeed, the Court is in no hurry to adapt the direct application
model due to the traditional acceptance that the broad use of valve
See infra Chapter I(4).
See A LEXY, supra note 3, at xl-xli (proposing that the protective duties
arising from constitutional rights give rise to new private right laws between
individuals, through the interpretation of private law statutes and the
development of the common law).
26 See ALLAN R. BREWER-CARÍAS, CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS POSITIVE
LEGISLATORS: A COMPARATIVE LAW STUDY 162 (2011) (noting that Germany has
adopted the technique of issuing orders to the Legislator to impose terms or
deadlines before which it must take the necessary legislative action).
24
25
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concepts and legal standards such as “good faith” and “public
policy” provide a wide enough spectrum for the judiciary to protect
human rights within private law. However, we think that this
preference is problematic since the valve concepts lack a priori
contents of their own. This in turn evokes the question of whether
we are actually dealing with a direct application model in disguise.
Rather, we opine that (1) all elements of society have a direct duty
to protect human rights of the other instead of a general vague duty
to protect public policy, (2) human rights hold an honorable role in
all legal systems, including private law.
Additionally, the differences between the manner with which
human rights are treated in public and private law creates a barrier
to the general protection of human rights in the democratic system.
Thus, ostensibly creating two separate legal systems and
disregarding the fundamental guarantee of human rights.
Moreover, we hold that the source of the implemented rights does
not influence the extent of their implementation—in other words,
the direct application model does not grant citizens, per se,
additional rights, rather it is reliant on the ad hoc balancing of their
constitutional rights, as enacted by the indirect application model.
This claim also has declaratory and educational advantages.
Through a general declaration stating that human rights set in
constitutions apply in all legal interactions, and through a direct and
explicit judicial reference to them in every relevant legal interaction
presented to the courts, the direct application model can help us
understand the context of human rights, their conceptual role, and
their place within democratic theory.27
2.3. Balancing Human Rights Confliction within the Direct
Application Model
The arguments for rejecting the direct application model and
adopting the indirect application model rely largely on practical
concerns over excessive violation of individual rights in the direct
application model. These arguments, however, mistakenly conflate
two separate questions—one discussing the mode of applying
human rights, and the other regarding the balance between
27 See Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV.
L. REV. 193, 208 (1952) (pointing out that educating toward democracy is one of the
roles of the judiciary in a democratic society).
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conflicting human rights. In our view, the question about the mode
of applying human rights in private law—both direct and indirect—
does not help answer the second question of the balance between
conflicting human rights in private law. Quite the opposite. As is
described in the next section, various legal systems already use a
range of doctrines and techniques to apply human rights in private
law, subjecting it to human rights standards.28 But these too, by
themselves, fail to answer questions about the scope of conflicting
rights and the balance between them. This issue requires a separate
analysis that is obviously influenced by the private or public
standing of the body that violates human rights.29 This standing is
not derived, strengthened, or weakened due to the use of the direct
or indirect application model of human rights set in the constitution.
In the first stage of a court’s analysis, it is determined whether an
individual has a constitutional right to be protected from the
government (or from another individual), and in its second stage,
the scope and contents of the right will be determined. Ferreres
Comella and Kumm emphasize that differences between various
legal systems in the application of human rights in private law
originate in structural and procedural variations rather than in the
essential question of balancing conflicting human rights: “There is a
line to be drawn between the public and the private sphere, but
doctrines such as indirect effect or state action have little to do with
guiding substantive choices about where the lines are to be
drawn.”30
In the application of the models and any discourse on rights, the
balancing act is an inevitable and inherent feature. Ultimately every
right is relative, whether located in public or private law and the
balancing act between conflicting human rights is implicit in the
current use of valve concepts. We can and should also implement
valve concepts in the direct application model, relying on the
proportionality and balance tests set in the constitution and in the

See Kumm & Ferreres Comella, supra note 4.
Michal Tamir, Human Rights in Private Law: Hybridization of the Balancing
Tests, in ISRAELI CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE MAKING 401 (Gideon Sapir, Daphne
Barak-Erez, & Aharon Barak eds., 2013).
30
Kumm & Ferreres Comella, supra note 4, at 284.
28
29
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case law, while taking into account that this balance between
conflicting human rights is taking place in the private sphere.
Choosing the direct application model allows us to be concerned
with the true challenge facing all forms of application—the balance
and proportionality of conflicting human rights according to the
interaction at stake. Ultimately, the issue in a democracy is the
conflict between two conflicting rights.31 As long as the direct
application model endorses a proper system of balances, we should
not fear it might entail harm to individual liberties (beyond the one
already inflicted by the indirect application model) and to the
worthy separation between private and public law. Private law
presumes that an individual (or a private entity) works for its own
benefit, whereas in public law it is presumed that the government
works only for the collective benefit. The government, as the
public’s trustee, clearly has no rights of its own, whereas individuals
do have rights of their own, a difference inevitably leading to
distinctions in the scope of their duties. Obviously, the dosage of
human rights and duties to be weighed in the balance between one
individual and another, as well as between a corporation and an
individual, differ from those between the individual and the
government. The differences, however, are not a function of the
sources deriving human rights—especially when private entities
today, such as Google32 and Apple, are larger and more powerful
than some countries, while espousing “corporate social
responsibility”33 as discussed below.
The scope of the duty to respect human rights—which is not
derived in binary fashion (either government or private) from the
identity of the party to the interaction—is also influenced by more
subtle considerations touching, inter alia, on the relative power of the
confronting entities, on their exposure to the public realm, and on
the power of the constitutional right at stake. Thus, for example,
even within private law, the duty incumbent on individuals to
respect human rights is greater for those who enjoy significant
power and public exposure. Furthermore, the determination of the
borders between conflicting human rights follows not only from the
See KASHER, supra note 6, at 16.
See SHUMEET BALUJA, THE SILICON JUNGLE: A NOVEL OF DECEPTION, POWER
AND INTERNET INTRIGUE (2015) (discussing Google’s overt economic and political
power in today’s market).
33 See Archie B. Carroll, Corporate Social Responsibility: Evolution of a Definitional
Construct, 38(3) BUS. & SOC’Y 268 (1999) (discussing the evolution of corporate social
responsibility since the beginning of the 1950s).
31
32
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identity of the infringing party but also from the identity of the party
whose right has been infringed (such as a government body, a
powerful socio-economic corporation, a small corporation, or an
individual). Be that as it may, the fundamental duty to respect human
rights in the democratic system is indifferent to these questions. The
source of this fundamental right is the constitution and the legal
system’s basic laws. The constitution creates the law and given this
supremacy, the basic rights determined within it should have
immediate and constant influence on private law, particularly in the
absence of a sub-constitutional norm that regulates these
relationships.
Alternatively, this article’s fundamental approach on the direct
application of human rights on the public and on the need for a
constant balance between them draws further support from the
significant changes in imposing human rights on business
corporations,34 an issue which we thoroughly discuss in the next
part, and from the increasing use of contract law for that purpose.
Contract law, the quintessential realm of private law, serves as a
dominant framework for implementing human rights in private
law.35 Human rights are tested through private day-to-day
interactions no less, and perhaps even more so, than in individual
encounters with the government. Direct application of human
rights in the most banal voluntary interactions seems to reinforce
their role and the awareness of them in every individual and every
agency, in all places and at all times.
Recognizing the power and responsibility of individuals in the
interpersonal context, then, enhances the protection of basic
freedoms as well as the role of all components of the legal system—
not only the government—in the structuring of a freedom-fostering
society. This approach is not surprising since the contractual
34 Cf. Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 1, with
Gavriel Mairone A Grotian Moment: Corporations are Required to Respect Human
Rights, 54 JUSTICE 27 (Summer 2014) (discussing the tumultuous relationship
between corporate responsibility and human rights); John Gerard Ruggie, Business
and Human Rights: The Evolving Incarnational Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 818 (2007)
(discussing the evolving nature of corporate responsibility regarding human rights
in the wake of the 2003 UN recommended “Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human
Rights.”); Donald Robertson, Business & Human Rights: A New Era of Accountability?
(Sydney L. Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14/75, 2014) (discussing the
complexity of corporate liability since the publication of the 2011 UN Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights).
35 See ELI BUKSPAN, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF BUSINESS L AW 60–71 (2007)
[Heb.] (In Israel this also holds true for torts, labor law, property law, and others).
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institution, perhaps more than any other legal act, is sensitive to the
human rights of the other. The main purpose of a contract is to
enable people, as social animals, to create relationships, to realize
themselves, and to voluntarily satisfy most of their needs through
coordination, cooperation, and mutual concessions. In this sense, an
ordinary interpersonal contract may be seen as a microcosm of the
social contract that explains the existence of the most basic human
frameworks. Entrenched in both the private and the social contract
is insight on the importance of imposing limitation on liberties so as
to actually enable their existence and expansion.
Therefore, the implementation of human rights in the most
common and diverse private interactions, contract and corporate
law alike, prepares for the direct application of human rights, a
message that also indicates the general importance of human rights
as well.
2.4. Comparative Law—Close Proximity to the Direct Application
Model
With the exponential rise in international discourse on the
application of human rights in private law, as is described in the next
section, the variety of contrasting constitutions and legal structures
evident in different states cannot be ignored. As we believe that the
proper and efficient way to decrease human rights violations in the
private sector is through internal state action in accordance to the
UN General Principles, this section will be devoted to describing the
slow, but sure, change toward the direct application model that can
be seen in legal systems worldwide.
Indeed, various countries separate human rights from private
law in the procedural, rhetorical sense. However, in the essential
sense, the depth perception and the judicial trend prevailing in most
legal systems push toward growing recognition of the application of
human rights in private law.
Though few constitutions explicitly determine that the direct
application approach applies, such as South Africa and Greece, most
countries’ courts generally endorse an interpretive move that blurs
this certitude. Other constitutions, such as those of the United States
and Canada, convey reservations concerning their application in
private law. For example, the Canadian Charter determines that
constitutional rights ostensibly apply only in the relationship
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between the state and individuals.36 Similarly, almost all sections of
the U.S. Bill of Rights explicitly address the relationships between
the state and the citizen. However, the Thirteenth Amendment to
the Constitution, in a formulation that departs from the general
trend, the American legislator determined the implicit direct
application of a specific constitutional right—freedom from
slavery—between individuals.37
Whereas the constitutions of the United States and Germany are
not unequivocal on the direct application of human rights in private
law, the formulation in the Greek constitution is clear-cut. An
amendment dating back to 2001 inserted into the constitution an
explicit section that applies constitutional rights in Greek private
law:38
The rights of human being as an individual and as a member of
the society and the principle of the welfare rule of law are
guaranteed by the State. All agents of the State shall be obliged to
ensure the unhindered exercise thereof. These rights also apply to
the relations between individuals to which they are appropriate.
The constitution of South Africa, as said above, also determines
the direct application of constitutional rights on private law, stating
“[a] provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person
if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the
nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the
right.”39
36 See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982, Art. 31(1) (“This Charter applies(a) to the Parliament and government of
Canada in respect of all matters within the authority of Parliament . . . and (b) to the
legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters within the
authority of the legislature of each province.”).
37 See U.S. Const. amend XIII, §2 (stating “Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction.”); see also INDIA CONST. art. 15, § 2 (prohibiting discrimination on the
grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth.).
38
2001 SYNTAGMA [SYN.][CONSTITUTION] 25 (Greece).
39 See S. AFR. CONST., 1996 Art. 8.
See also BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV]
[CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 35, para. 1 (Switz.) (adopting the direct
application model of human rights in private law. In other countries, such as
Ireland, Spain, and Brazil, high courts interpreted certain constitutional rights as
applying to interpersonal relations as well). Maria Vittoria Onufrio, The
Constitutionalization of Contract Law in the Irish, the German and the Italian Systems: is
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Still, this brief review, pointing out differences in the wording of
the different constitutions, is insufficient in outlining the accepted
model for the application of human rights to interpersonal
relationships. Unfortunately, neither is a review of the comparative
case law on the accepted approaches of the application of human
rights in private law.40
The German constitution, for example, unequivocally
determines the model of application that applies in German law. It
appears that the German constitution views the protection of human
rights as a general social task that compels not only the authorities,
as implicit from Section 1(2) and 1(3) of the German constitution
stating, “(2) The German People therefore acknowledge inviolable
and inalienable human rights as the basis of every human
community, of peace, and of justice in the world. (3) The following
basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive and the judiciary
as directly applicable law.”41
However, in Germany, as in other countries, court has found
ways to apply its determinations to private law as evident in
German judicial holdings.42 Beginning with the Lüth case, a variety
of decisions show an indirect application of human rights in private
law at the formal institutional level.43 This is because only German
constitutional courts can hear claims that are authorized to
determine the constitutionality of a law and the way that compels

horizontal
indirect
effect
like
direct
effect?
4
INDRET
(2007),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1371538
[https://perma.cc/6TSN-JT4N] (discussing the horizontal effect of constitutional
rights which has been accepted by many European countries); THE ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 184–85 (Mark Tushnet, Thomas Fleiner &
Cheryl Saunders eds., 2013) (stating that Canada and South Africa especially
interesting examples regarding the horizontal-effect doctrine and how it has proven
to be a popular transplant).
40 See Kumm & Comella, supra note 4, at 284 (explaining that an attempt was
made to explain the difference through institutional and formal arguments).
41
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW], art. 1, translation at http://www.gesetzeim-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html [https://perma.cc/S6AK-GD42].
42
BVerfGE 7/198, Jan. 15, 1958, https://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org
[https://perma.cc/SX93-NEJG];
BVerfGE
39/1,
1975,
http://www.hrcr.org/safrica/life/39bverfge1.html
[https://perma.cc/S2CVXFCB].
43 Id.
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individuals to respect it.44 This means that “mundane” courts lack
discretion to apply human rights in private law in cases between
individuals. The non-recognition of explicit direct application
seems to reflect the suspicion that such recognition would enable
civil courts in Germany to issue rulings on matters bearing on
individual constitutional rights, which would not be an issue in
Common Law systems such as the United States and Israel. Yet,
given that in a conflict between individuals the German civil court
is compelled to rule in the spirit of constitutional rights (even though
they are only determined in the constitutional court), the
justification for determining how constitutional rights are applied
obviously relies on procedural rather than essential grounds. In
other words, barring any influence on the court’s practical and final
authority to rule on constitutional rights, which cover all areas of the
law,45 it is hard to find in Germany a principled-practical difference
(as opposed to a procedural one) between direct and indirect
application.46
Another interesting case to examine the legal system’s vague
attitude to the application of human rights in private law is the one
used in Canadian law that formally adopts a model assuming nonapplication. Nevertheless, the case law essentially attests to rulings
that lessen the dominance of this model in favor of one that
increasingly strengthens the influence of human rights between
individuals.47 Resembling the German model, the Canadian model
endorses the approach that private law and legislation must develop
in the spirit of the basic rights determined in the constitution and, in
Canada, in the Charter.48
See Kumm & Comella, supra note 4, at 275.
See id. at 244–245.
46 See id. at 250–251; Tamir, supra note 29, at 405 (referring to cases where
courts in Switzerland and Germany applied to themselves the direct application
model through judicial legislation).
47 See RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 (Can.) (holding the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms applies to governmental action). See also
Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 (Can.) (interpreting
Ontario’s libel laws in connection with the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms).
48 See Lorraine E. Weinrib & Ernest J. Weinrib, Constitutional Values and Private
Law in Canada, in H UMAN RIGHTS IN PRIVATE LAW (DANIEL FRIEDMANN & DAPHNE
BARAK-EREZ EDS., 2001).
44
45
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The U.S. case is even more complex since the U.S. Constitution
addresses government responsibility. The central approach in
American law emphasizes that the judicial system is part of the
ruling administration to which the Constitution applies and,
therefore, rights are applied in American law by means of the
judiciary. Let us begin by noting that the accepted doctrine for
applying human rights in private law, in the United States too, is the
doctrine of state action stating that the demand of a constitutional
right must be based on a state action, either through the constitution
or through legislation.49 The doctrine of state action, however,
which compels the state to protect human rights, applies to judges
as well in their role as a branch of government.50 Indeed, as is noted
above, the formulation in the American constitution determines that
claims of breaching constitutional rights, with very few exceptions,
can only be addressed to the state.51 By comparison with the
German legal system, the doctrine of state action seems to separate
constitutional rights from private law far more clearly than the
doctrine of indirect application.52 Even with all of this, the American
system has also found ways to enable the flow of human rights into
private law.53
In one such example, the Court in Shelley significantly expanded
the doctrine of state action in the American legal system.54 In the
Shelly case, the Court considered a petition by a resident of St. Louis,
Missouri who sought to prevent an African-American family from
living in his neighborhood, relying on a contract forbidding the sale
of the house to “Blacks.” The Court concluded that even in classic
conflicts between individuals, every contract holds some sort of
state involvement, as it determines the relevant legal arrangements

See Kumm & Comella, supra note 4, at 266.
See BARAK, supra note 6, at 375.
51
The most prominent among them being the Thirteenth Amendment, which
can be interpreted as applying also to individuals the constitutional right to
freedom from slavery.
52 See e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding racially restrictive
covenants violated the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth amendment). See
also Kumm & Comella, supra note 4, at 245.
53 See Kumm & Comella, supra note 4, at 267.
54 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
49
50
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between individuals.55 Furthermore, relying on the idea that courts
can apply human rights through the judiciary, Shelly determined
that courts could not uphold actions that breach the right to
equality—which is protected in the U.S. Constitution.56 This
expanding interpretation of the Constitution, which covers all legal
realms, paves the way for applying constitutional rights in
individual relationships and practically voids the state action
requirement. The American court does indeed continue to endorse
a rhetoric that examines constitutional rights according to the
doctrine of state action and continues to preserve the official
division between direct and indirect application.57 This insistence,
however, including its formal arguments, is not clear, nor does it
seem to explain precisely why the law strives so hard and so
creatively to attain essential protection for human rights in private
law.
To summarize, the status of human rights in private law
(manifested in various constitutions) is, in principle, blurred and
subject to broad interpretation. Although the various legal systems
often refrain from defining the model of application as direct,
human rights seemingly play a clear and explicit role in private law.
Moreover, even when the direct application approach is explicitly
mentioned in constitutions, its judicial interpretation remains
vague. This can be seen in Greece, where the recognition of the
direct application constitutional model was a jurisprudence
innovation for the constitution’s relationship with private law. In
light of technological and social developments (including a shift of
power from the state to private players), this need arose with
changes in the media and its social influence and the growing need
to protect individual rights in the civil realm.58 This innovation
adopted the expression “horizontal balance” between rights or
“interpersonal influence” between individuals, entailing a violation

See Kumm & Comella, supra note 4, at 267.
See U.S. Const. amend. XIV (addressing citizenship and equal protection of
the laws and was proposed as a response to the American Civil War).
57 See Kumm & Comella, supra note 4, at 268.
58
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PRIVATE SPHERE : A COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra
note 5, at 159.
55
56
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of a right.59 Nevertheless, even in the Greek legal system, the scope
of human rights in private law and their application between
Resembling the Greek
individuals remains undetermined.60
constitution, the South African constitution also explicitly
determines the direct application of human rights in private law,
however, it still needs to be interpreted by judges.61
In conclusion, the development of the protection of human
rights in private law worldwide — based on considerations of
democracy, social justice, and cooperation — illustrates, or at the
very least predicts, the growing trend toward broader recognition of
the direct application model. Unquestionably, common law is ripe
for recognizing direct mutual relationships with the human rights
set in the constitution, and the next chapter discusses significant
international forces that promote this position.
3. THE DIRECT APPLICATION MODEL, MODERN CORPORATIONS, AND
UN LED INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES
Over the last few decades it has become very common to discuss
public aspects of corporations, particularly various social
obligations imposed on corporations. Due to the enormous financial
and political power that corporations have gained in the public
sphere, and their comprehensive impact on the lives of citizens, they
have been transformed into a legitimate key player in the discourse
on human rights—even those that are clearly privately originated.62
Id. at 158.
See Nicos Alivizatos & Pavlos Eleftheriadis, South European Briefing: The
Greek Constitutional Amendments of 2001, 7(1) SOUTH EUROPEAN SOC ’ Y AND POL ., 63–
71 (2002) (recognizing that, although, the constitution had performed well so far,
“wide amendment was necessary.” Unfortunately, the amendment “lost its
direction . . . .[and] became a vehicle for a vaguely defined modernization.”).
61
For further discussion of this topic, see Delisa Futch, Du Plessis v. De Klerk:
South Africa’s Bill of Rights and the Issue of Horizontal Application 22 N.C.J. I NT ’ L L. &
COM. REG. 1009, 1011 (1996-1997); see also Khumalo v. Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC)
(S. Afr.).
62 See John G. Ruggie & Tamaryn Nelson, Human Rights and the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Normative Innovations and Implementation
Challenges, 1, 2–6 (Harvard University, Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative,
Working
Paper
No.
66,
2015),
59
60
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In addition, human rights encounters arise frequently and have
become inherent in day-to-day private interactions with
corporations (regardless of their size, sector, location, ownership
and structure) — perhaps, much more than an average individual’s
encounter with their domestic government.63 Interactions between
individuals have reached beyond classical human rights violations,
such as slavery and unlivable work conditions, and focus on new
aspects, such as privacy, mental and economic well-being, and
gender.
In the next few paragraphs, we attempt to describe the current
state of affairs regarding the balance of power between corporations
and individuals, namely emphasizing the main changes regarding
human rights witnessed within modern corporations.
This
description will substantiate the claim that we are at a crossroads
heading toward the direct application of constitutional human
rights in light of the semi-public role of the private corporations in
the protection of human rights.
A brief numerical analysis supports this trend: 500 corporations
control about seventy percent of world trade and each year
approximately three million new limited liability companies are
registered. Likewise, the past decades show an increase in the
privatization of government functions private corporations have
increasingly acquired “state-like-impact.”64
Indeed, we are
witnessing an increasing number of corporations that choose to
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/programs/cri
/files/workingpaper.66.oecd.pdf [https://perma.cc/WX7Q-6S9A] (stating that
2011 OECD Guidelines dedicated human rights chapter that includes a formulation
of what it means for businesses to respect human rights and the corporate
responsibility of respecting human rights); see NADIA BERNAZ, BUSINESS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: HISTORY, LAW AND POLICY - BRIDGING THE ACCOUNTABILITY GAP 3–8 (2017)
(for more on corporate social responsibility and its influence on different forms of
capitalism).
63
Eric De Brabandere and Maryse Hazelzet, Corporate Responsibility and
Human Rights—Navigating between International, Domestic and Self-Regulation, 1, 2–6
(Universiteit Leiden, Research Handbook on Human Rights and International
Investment
Law,
2017),
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2913616
[https://perma.cc/2H62-J4DF] (explaining that there is an undeniable link
between human rights and non-state actors, which leds to an enhanced need of
accountability on behalf of the corporations).
64 See BALUJA, supra note 32. See also SARAH ANDERSON & JOHN CAVANAGH,
FIELD GUIDE TO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2005).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

446

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 40:2

adopt corporate activities in light of human rights principles, as well
as instill ideas of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) through
designated functionaries and publish a “social vision.”65
3.1. The Corporation in the Modern Era
The discourse surrounding questions of the corporations’ role in
advocating for human rights within democracy relates to an age-old
question in corporate law: should companies be exclusively
economic and profit-focused or should they also consider broader
social causes?66 This question will not be discussed in this article,
nor is it discussed whether corporations obey court rulings, or
whether courts and legal actors can or should serve as agents of
social change.67 Instead, our discussion focuses on those concrete
characteristics of corporations that illuminate the course of potential
social change. The implementation and development of legal
change as it applies to corporations does not occur randomly.
Rather, progress in social change naturally proceeds from factors
related to the corporation’s socio-economic pervasiveness and on
essential considerations related to their political and financial power
as social-legal mediators and social innovators, and lack of human
characteristics that interfere with freedom of contract and personal
autonomy.

65
DENISE WALLACE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND BUSINESS: A POLICY-ORIENTED
PERSPECTIVE 90–119 (2015).
66 Id.
67
Gad Barzilai, The Ambivalent Language of Lawyers in Israel: Liberal Politics,
Economic Liberalism, Silence and Dissent, in FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM:
COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF THE LEGAL COMPLEX AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM 247–279
(Terry C. Halliday et al. eds., Oxford and Portland Oregon: Hart Publications 2007)
(arguing that it is “the politics of a ‘legal complex’ of legally trained occupations . . .
that drives advances or retreats from political liberalism.”).
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3.1.1. The Corporation’s Pervasiveness as a Social Component
Most of society rests on the activities of companies or corporate
bodies.68 In fact today, some corporations are larger than states—
among the largest 100 organizations in the world, 52 are
corporations and 48, less than half, are states.69 Since most business
deals are conducted by corporations, their activity not only
dominates contractual interactions but also affects other human and
legal dimensions.
The business corporation’s routine contractual activities involve
countless arenas, including capital, labor, property, products, and
services. It is fitting that the corporation’s relationship with other
entities and communities is described as a “nexus of contracts,” a
particularly apt description regarding mega-corporations’
involvement in tangled webs of seemingly endless contracts.70 In
modern society individual self-realization depends, to a great
degree, on an individual’s success in negotiating the corporate
world. Thus, it is critical that values concerning social change and
human rights apply to corporations as well as to individuals.
3.1.2. The Corporation’s Exposure and Socio-Economic Power
The significance of corporations as social agents strongly affects
the change unfolding in modern discourse, primarily since
corporations are so widespread. Corporation’s independent legal
personalities, size, and the separation between ownership and
management, justify imposing social responsibility and
constitutional duties on their activities. For example, a corporation
(the most common corporate model) has an independent legal
personality that is separate from that of its investors, who have
limited responsibility for the company’s actions, omissions, and
68 See J. E. PARKINSON, CORPORATE POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY: ISSUES IN THE
THEORY OF COMPANY LAW (1993). See also ALFRED D. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND:
THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977).
69
ANDERSON & CAVANAGH, supra note 64.
70
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
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debts. As such, a corporation holds the incentive and the capability
to externalize its actions and omissions onto the non-corporate
world.71 Here, the “principal-agent problem” or “agent’s dilemma,”
the fundamental problem in company law, comes into play.72
This concept highlights the separation between ownership and
control and the ensuing externalization incentives. The “agent’s
dilemma” justifies and explains corporate and securities law, while
imposing on the company’s officers responsibilities toward those
subject to their decisions.73 The “agent’s dilemma” also intensifies
the demand to impose social responsibility and human rights on
business companies and their agents, due to their inherent
incentives to focus on their own interests at the expense of other
corporate constituencies, including, inter alia, the capital,
environmental and human (both labor and customers) realms.74
The corporation’s public dimension and standing are greater
than the individual’s; the corporation’s public nature is evidenced
by its similarities to a state in terms of structure and socio-economic
power.75 Aharon Barak relied on these grounds in dismissing the
notion that human rights are “not applicable” to private law:
Human rights are endangered not only by governments . . . human
rights are greatly endangered by non-governmental bodies. Indeed,
some even claim that, in democratic regimes, human rights face
greater danger from other individuals than from the government.76
The greater the public exposure and consequences of interaction,
the greater lies its responsibility especially due to its wide-scale
71
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479 (2001)
(arguing that veil piercing cannot be justified and should be abolished because it
has no social payoff and a regime of direct liability should be put in place.).
72 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 70.
73 See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION & PRIVATE PROPERTY (1991) (analyzing the separation of ownership
and control within a corporation and the consequences of that dynamic).
74 See Further Hearing 7/81 Penider, Investment Co. v. Castro 37(4) PD 673, 694
(1983) (Isr.); CrimA 4148/03 Cohen v. State of Israel 58(2) PD 629, 632 (2004) (Isr.).
75
The regime of a business company is very similar to that of a democratic
state. Thus, for instance, the structure of rights and voting in a business company,
from which “control” also derives, is usually set up democratically, i.e., one vote
per share. The institutional structure and the typical corporate government of the
business company also resemble a state. Similar to government, a business
company also has a small and elected implementing body (the board and the
executive) that holds control through the delegation of authority. The social
attitude toward the business company is also illustrated in the vigorous discussion
of its social purposes, far exceeding the maximization of the shareholders’ wealth.
76
Aharon Barak, Protected Human Rights and Private Law, in KLINGHOFER BOOK
ON PUBLIC LAW 163, 208 (Y. Zamir. Ed.) (Heb.) (emphasis added).
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influence and ability to “endanger” its many constituencies. Thus,
public companies with marketable investments and publicly traded
shares have increased social responsibility more than that of small
family firms with limited social exposure and few investors.
Similarly, large, multinational conglomerates have greater social
responsibility (mainly toward consumers) than small businesses.
The graded imposition of social responsibility according to a
corporation’s potential level of exposure rests on both utilitarian and
functional grounds. Acknowledging the social responsibility of the
corporation “simultaneously” acknowledges its effects on a
relatively large number of “beneficiaries.”
3.1.3. The Use of the Corporation as a Legal-Social Mediator
The prevalent social exposure of corporations as opposed to that
of individuals suggests another possible explanation for the
development of social and constitutional change as it applies to
them. As we note, society is significantly affected by the existence,
actions, and views of large companies.77 A corporation, whether
small or large, is a community composed of a nexus of contracts.
The nature of corporations, specifically that they are comprised of
many participants, enables them to act as “mediators” in the
adoption of social norms.78
The influence of the corporation, then, is not only “local”—
affecting only the human elements close to it, such as its officials and
77 See PARKINSON, supra note 68, at ch. 1.
See also CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY: THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF THE 21ST CENTURY (Ramon Mullerat
ed., 2005) (compiling insights on the function of corporate social responsibility and
how it works worldwide).
78
Robert D. Cooter & Melvin A. Eisenberg, Fairness, Character, and Efficiency
in Firms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1717 (2001) (demonstrating how a company can
encourage trust and good character among its agents in ways that overcome the
agency problem and encourage others to cooperate). See also Melvin A. Eisenberg,
Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253 (2018) (examining the
relationship between social norms and certain areas of corporate law like fiduciary
duties, corporate governance, and takeovers); THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS
FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 297 (2005) (“[Global
corporations] are going to command more power, not only to create value but also
to transmit values, than any transnational institutions on the planet.”).
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employees—but extends also to a broader public that includes the
corporation’s clients, suppliers, and shareholders (however small
and scattered).
Indeed, it is common, particularly when
environmental liability is at stake, for the corporation’s actions to
influence the general public. The goal is to create mechanisms that
account for social considerations arising from the company’s actions
and the company’s relationships with associated communities.
A good example of this type of mechanism is adoption of ethics
programs.79 Ethics programs and codes usually include systematic
visions of constitutive legal, social, and business validity, which
represent and explain compulsory ethical rules, inter alia on the basis
of the organization’s constitutive features and of democratic values.
The codes relate to such topics as responsibility, trust, credibility,
honesty, professionalism, and sensitivity to the organization’s
negative image. They are also concerned with the organization’s
commitment to the protection of human dignity, especially to life
and health, to its clients (creditors, suppliers, employees, and the
public), and to environmental issues. In this manner, the ethics code
is a link that serves to mediate between the economic goals of the
corporation and its social ones and serves as an identity card that is
unique to the company and can reflect the company’s context and
its responsibility toward society.
3.1.4. The Autonomy of Personal Will in a Corporate Context
Due to corporate characteristics, the typical corporation can
further the development of social and constitutional changes more
79 See Eli Bukspan & Asa Kasher, Ethic in Business Corporations: Legal and Moral
Considerations, 2 L. & BUS. 159 (2005) (Heb.). See also Growing the Carrot: Encouraging
Effective Corporate Compliance, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1783 (1996) (assessing the
difficulties that corporations face in deciphering and complying with the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations, and suggesting additional and
potentially more effective measures for ensuring appropriate corporate conduct);
The Good, the Bad, and Their Corporate Codes of Ethics: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley, and the
Problems with Legislating Good Behavior, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2122–41 (2003) (arguing
that the good intentions of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation will do little to improve
corporate behavior due to complications surrounding the drafting of corporate
codes and the way the statute incentivizes rewriting the corporate codes of wellbehaved companies in order to avoid litigation).
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effectively than individuals can. Besides their greater social
exposure and power, the corporations’ lack of a natural (as opposed
to a legal) personality eases their categorization as significant social
actors and explains their relative dominance in the process of social
change affecting the international discourse. The corporations’ legal
personality may explain the reason why the court has shown higher
readiness to interfere with their freedom of contract (through the
principles of good faith and public order) than with that of
individuals.
In other words, although corporations enjoy
constitutional protection and are acknowledged as legal
personalities and individual liberties do not fully apply to them.80
A corporation is an artificial creation and interference in its
affairs touches on financial issues rather than on personal rights.
Given the autonomy of private will, the usual reluctance to apply
basic principles of public law to private law is milder.81 Intuitive
and legal sensitivity to the constitutional right (the autonomy of
personal will) is thus lower when the subject is a corporation. This
fact can also explain the jurisprudential inclination, even if
unconscious, to encourage adoption of social responsibility as it
applies to corporations through the erosion of the traditional laws of
autonomy—contract law.
A more qualified protection of corporate freedom of contract
relies on an approach suggested in literature and in judicial opinions
80 See generally Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of
Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173 (1985) (suggesting that the Santa Clara case
has not been fully understood and that the brief opinion does not express a pro-bigbusiness theory of the corporation); Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the
Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441 (1987) (discussing the
historical reasons for why corporations are referred to as legal persons rhetorically,
and noting that the original theoretical reasoning for the rhetorical convention no
longer applies to modern corporate law); Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal:
Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS L. J. 577 (1990) (assessing why the
Supreme Court provided Bill of Rights guarantees to corporations and evaluating
which theory of corporations would allow for such protections).
81
Perceiving the corporation as real is actually compatible with imposing
responsibility on it. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformations of the
Corporate Form: A Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 767 (2005) (tracing the changes to corporate form throughout history and
the accompanying theories of the corporation, and positing that the dominant real
entity theory of the corporation is compatible with corporate social responsibility
measures).
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whereby not all rights held by people are also held by corporations.82
Thus, an existence of a physical entity does not necessarily lead to the
protection of autonomy of personal will. The liberty at stake first and
foremost protects the “human” in people and as such, its application
to a corporation is not without question.
In conclusion, there is no doubt that corporations play a
significant role in democracies today and are natural trustees for
reinforcing human rights. However, both the state domain and the
global domain attempt to prevent corporations from violating
human rights. These challenges mainly arise from the principles of
international human rights law, which is nearly always state-based
and applicable to corporations or the private sphere through specific
legislation: first, the state has sovereignty to determine the extent of
human rights law to be applied in its territory; second, even though
the past few decades have shown incredible progress in
standardizing human rights law within international law,
corporations are generally not recognized as entities bound by
international law.83
Accordingly, the direct application model presented in this
article justifies and establishes suitable and practical
intergovernmental solutions to applying human rights to
corporations and contend with the trends described. This approach
coincides with the winds of change that have defined recent
international discourse on human rights and corporations;
advocating that states, rather than international law and multilateral
initiatives, must prevent violations of human rights by
corporations.84

82 See CA 105/92 Re’em Engineers & Constructors Ltd. v. Nazareth Ilit
Municipality 47(5) PD 189, 212–214 (1993) (Isr.) (“A corporation enjoys liberties
enabled by its character as a corporation. Freedom of occupation, property rights,
defendant’s rights, and other rights for which the existence of a physical (‘flesh and
blood’) entity is not vital (such as the right to a family) are the lot of every legal
personality. Hence, a corporation enjoys freedom of expression, as does any flesh
and blood creature.”).
83
Dana Weiss, Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights, in MARKET, LAW AND
POLITICS: ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 65, 67 (Resling ed., 2012) (Heb.).
84 See Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal
Responsibility, 111 YALE L. J. 443 (2001) (providing justifications for the advantages
of using international law and multilateral initiatives to increasingly enforce human
rights on corporations).
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3.2. New International Discourse and Institutional Conceptual
Change
Two main aspects lead to the conclusion that the direct
application model in corporate context provides an efficient
alternative to safeguarding and protecting human rights today. The
first aspect, discussed above, shows the significance of corporations
in modern democracies. The second aspect deals with increasing
international discourse on human rights and corporations—led by
the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework that can be found in
the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business Human Rights
which is applicable to “all States and to all business enterprises,
both transnational and others, regardless of their size, sector,
location, ownership and structure.”85 Despite the fact that this
discourse takes place internationally, its implementation focuses on
individual state action. The international discourse on corporation’s
human rights responsibilities—in addition to the legal blurring of
the once clear line between the private and public spheres that is
mentioned above—strengthens the claim that the purpose of the
corporation no longer solely focuses on sustaining profits, rather it
plays an important societal role in protecting human rights.
Escalating reports of human rights violations by corporations
triggered the establishment of the 1998 United Nations (UN) SubCommision on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
working group on business and human rights.86 The group’s task
was to recommend and propose methods to promote economic,
social, and political rights87—producing a twenty-three article
85
Rep. of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31, at 6 (Mar. 21, 2011) (annexing the Guiding Principles to
a report made to the Human Rights Council). See also WALLACE, supra note 65, at
233–251 (showing attempts of the United Nations to regulate transnational
corporations); César Rodríguez-Garavito, Business and Human Rights: Beyond the End
of the Beginning in BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: BEYOND THE END OF THE BEGINNING
11 (César Rodríguez-Garavito ed., 2017).
86
John G. Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International
Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 819, 820 (2007).
87
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination & Protection of
Minorities Res. 1988/8,, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/Res/1998/8 (Aug. 20, 1998).
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document in 2003. However, their recommendations were not
approved by the Commission on Human Rights (since replaced by
the Human Rights Council).88
Although the document was not approved—nor was it binding
—89 the impact of the document resonated throughout several
leading countries beliving that the issue of business and human
rights did require serious attention.90 In 2005, the UN Secretary
General, Kofi Annan, appointed a Special Representative—
Professor John Gerard Ruggie—with a wide-ranging mandate to
“identify and clarify” international standards and policies in
relation to business and human rights, elaborate on key concepts
including “corporate complicity” and “spheres of influence,” and
submit “views and recommendations” for consideration by the
commission.91
During the first two years of his mandate, Ruggie empirically
mapped current international standards and practices regarding
business and human rights, ranging from the most deeply rooted
international legal obligations to voluntary initiatives.92 After three
years, Ruggie made only one recommendation: the most effective
way to conceptualize the way forward was through the “Protect,
Respect and Remedy” Framework,93 which he elaborated in his final
report.94 The Framework rests on three pillars:

88
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, Draft Norms on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprise with regard
to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/Res/1998/8 (Aug. 20, 1198).
89
UN Human Rights Commission Res. 2004/11, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.2/2014/L.73/Rev.1 (Apr. 20, 2004)
90
Ruggie, supra note 86, at 821.
91
UN Human Rights Commission Res. 2005/69, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2005/L.87 at 2 (Apr. 15, 2005).
92
Ruggie, supra note 86, at 819.
93
John G. Ruggie & Tamaryn Nelson, Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises: Nomative Innovation and Implementation Challenges 3
(Harv. Kennedy Sch. Corp. Soc. Resp. Initiative Working Paper No. 66, 2015).
94
John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue
of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises),
Protect, Respect, and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, U.N. doc.
A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008).
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1. It is the state’s duty to protect against human rights abuses by
third parties, including business, through appropriate policymaking, regulation, and adjudication;
2. Corporations have an independent responsibility to respect
human rights: business enterprises should act with due diligence to
avoid infringing upon the rights of others and to address adverse
situations with which they are involved;
3. Victims of human rights abuses need greater access to
effective remedies, be them judicial or non-judicial.
After six years of extensive research, in 2011, the UN Human
Rights Council unanimously “endorsed” the Framework and its
thirty-one Guiding Principles, marking the first time a UN body had
ever endorsed a normative text that governments did not negotiate
themselves.95
Although the Framework and Guiding Principles are not legally
binding, they provided an unprecedented international standard for
states and corporations to take an active role in protecting human
rights. Their resonance and impact worldwide is indisputable, with
numerous international bodies and states adopting and
implementing the Guiding Principles on large corporations. In light
of this, a 2017 UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights
provided guidelines to assist small and medium sized enterprises
(SME’s), defined commonly as companies with under 250
employees, to implement the Guiding Principles.96 These new
guidelines highlight and emphasize that although the SME’s may
have less capacity and more informal processes, their impact upon
human rights can be just as significant as on transnational
corporations.97
Numerous important resolutions have been adopted within the
three major UN organs dealing with human rights − the Third
Committee of the General Assembly,98 the United Nations High
Ruggie & Nelson, supra note 93, at 5.
Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Working Group on the issue of human
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/35/32 (2017).
97 See RODRÍGUEZ-GARAVITO, supra note 85, at 19–22.
98 See generally Social, Humanitarian & Cultural Issues (Third Committee),
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY
OF
THE
UNITED
NATIONS
https://www.un.org/en/ga/third/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/XX57-4S7R].
95
96
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Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)99 and the United Nation
Human Rights Council,100 in light of the Guiding Principles. First,
Resolution 26/22, proposed by Norway, focused on the “Access to
Remedy” Pillar of the Guiding Principles.101 In this resolution, in
order to redress the imbalance of remedies for victims of human
rights violations, the Human Rights Council requested to “continue
work to facilitate the sharing and exploration of the full range of
legal options and practical measures to improve access to remedy
for victims of business-related human rights abuses.”102 Second, In
November 2014,103 OHCHR launched the “Accountability and
Remedy Project” in order to contribute to more effective
implementation of the Guiding Principles. The project focused on
substantive legal and practical issues that have an impact upon the
effectiveness of judicial mechanisms in achieving corporate
accountability and access to remedy in cases of business-related
human rights abuses. Third, the 2030 Agenda for sustainable
99 See generally UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org [https://perma.cc/2Q3U-49K2].
100
The
Human
Rights
Council
replaced
the
former
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CHR/Pages/
CommissionOnHumanRights.aspx [https://perma.cc/FAF2-MWPF]; See UNITED
NATIONS
HUMAN
RIGHTS
COUNCIL,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/AboutCouncil.aspx
[https://perma.cc/C522-5DUY] (detailing the history of the Human Rights
Council and how it replaced the former United Nations Commission on Human
Rights).
101
Note Resolution 26/9, proposed by Ecuador, to establish an open-ended
intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other
business enterprises with respect to human rights to elaborate an international
legally binding instrument to regulate activities of transnational corporations and
other business enterprises. This Resolution has not received much support, as the
creators of the General Principles envisioned their application on an individual
state level, and an international binding treaty would decrease their chance of
implementation throughout the world. Human Rights Council Res. 26/9, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/9 (Jul 14, 2014).
102
Human Rights Council Res. 26/22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/22 at 3
(Jul. 15, 2014).
103 See OHCHR Accountability and Remedy Project: Improving accountability and
access to remedy in cases of business involvement in human rights abuses, UN OFFICE OF
THE HIGH COMMISSIONER ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/OHCHRaccountabilityand
remedyproject.aspx [https://perma.cc/FG4X-3LQW] (explaining the purposes
and phases of the Accountability and Remedy Project).
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development adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September
2015,104 expresses another perspective of the important role of the
Guiding Principles in the private sector. This agenda includes a plan
of action with 17 goals to be in initiated over the next 15 years and
specifically acknowledges the desire to diversify the private sector,
from micro-enterprises to cooperatives to multinational
corporations, calling “upon all businesses to apply their creativity
and innovation to solving sustainable development challenges.”105
In June 2017, the Human Rights Council asked that a working group
on the issue of human rights, transnational corporations, and other
business enterprises give due consideration to the implementation
of the Guiding Principles in the context of the 2030 Agenda.106
In addition, the Guiding Principles have been effective outside
the United Nations as well.107 A leading example can be seen in the
2011 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD)108 Guidelines Revision,109 which included also an added
human rights chapter indicating the importance of businesses to
respect human rights and determine the systems that companies
instill to meet their responsibility to respect human rights, centered
on human rights due-diligence processes. In addition, the “General
Policies” chapter of the OECD Guidelines repeats the General
Principles framework to respect human rights, while establishing a
new due-diligence requirement for all subjects covered by the
Guidelines.110 Additional examples can be seen in the International

104
G.A. Res. 70/1, Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
(Oct. 21, 2015).
105 Id. at 29.
106
Human Rights Council Res. 35, U.N Doc. A/HRC/35/L.11, at 3 (June 19,
2017).
107
WALLACE, supra note 65, at 119–132.
108
The OECD is an intergovernmental economic organization with 35
member countries, which focuses on promoting policies that will improve
economic and social well-being. See generally ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV.,
http://www.oecd.org [https://perma.cc/28JX-6Q3F].
109
Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev. [OECD], OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises 2011 edition (2011) (providing advice to multinational
businesses on how to conduct business responsibly).
110
Ruggie & Nelson, supra note 94, at 5–6.
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Finance Corporation (IFC)111—the largest global institution focusing
exclusively on encouraging the private sector development in
developing countries; the adoption of the ISO 2600’s Social
Responsibility Standard of the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO),112 providing guidance rather than rules for its
members on social responsibility −translating the Guiding
Principles into effective action.
Moreover, the Guiding Principles have found their way into the
European Union, seen by the European Commission initiative to
produce produced guidelines for small and medium-sized
enterprises in accordance with the Guiding Principles. Over the past
few years, there have been significant steps paving the way for
regulation that will be uniformly binding for all EU member states.
In December 2014, the European Commission published the directive
on disclosure of non-financial and diversity information, which
determines that all large public-interest entities (listed companies,
banks, insurance undertakings and other companies that are so
designated by Member States) with more than 500 employees
should disclose in their management report relevant and useful
information on their policies, main risks, and outcomes relating to
human rights. The Directive required the Commission to prepare
non-binding guidelines on reporting non-financial information,
which should be first reported in early 2018.113 An additional area
showing the EU’s intent to promote binding regulation is the EU
institution’s political agreement to control trade in “conflict
minerals” (tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold) from conflict-affected
and high-risk areas.114
111 See
generally
INT’L
FIN.
CORP.,
http://www.ifc.org
[https://perma.cc/R4KY-3QXF].
112 See
generally ISO 26000 - Social Responsibility, INT’L ORG. FOR
STANDARDIZATION,
https://www.iso.org/iso-26000-social-responsibility.html
[https://perma.cc/6G76-TY6A] (collecting information concerning ISO 26000
including supporting organizations and relevant publications).
113 See
generally
Company
Reporting,
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/company-reporting/nonfinancial_reporting/index_en.htm [https://perma.cc/FED2-ZFFU] (providing
resources on financial and non-financial reporting requirements for the EU).
114
See 2017 O.J. 60 (May 19, 2017) available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2017:130:TOC. In May 2017 the European Parliament
approved a draft of the regulation. The “conflict minerals” law will oblige all but
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Most importantly, the Guiding Principles have reached
individual states, which have slowly begun to implement various
corporate regulations on human rights. Many countries choose to
create a National Action Plan (NAP)—a state policy outlining the
strategic orientation and concrete activities to address a specific
policy issue, advocated by the UN Working Group on the issue of
human rights and transnational corporations and business
enterprises.115 The NAP outline provides states recommendations
on implementing the General Principles on procedural and content
aspects to be considered in the light of the national context.116
France is one of the leading countries to implement the Guiding
Principles.117 In February 2017, the French National Assembly
passed a legislation requiring French-based companies, which
directly or indirectly employ at least 5,000 workers in France or
10,000 workers worldwide, to establish a “plan de vigilance” (due
diligence document),118 addressing all possible risks within the
corporation’s daily work in the areas of human rights (the legislation
was later declared constitutional by the French Constitutional
Court).119 Any company breaching this law faces civil liability and

the smallest EU importers of tin, tungsten, tantalum, gold to do “due diligence”
checks, in accordance with OECD guidelines, on their suppliers. Moreover, big
manufacturers will also have to disclose how they plan to monitor their sources to
comply with the rules. Due diligence obligations will apply from January 1, 2021
to allow member states time to appoint competent authorities and importers to
become familiar with their obligations. Although this regulation is very specific, it
indicates a step towards direct application of human right in the private sphere.
115 See RODRÍGUEZ-GARAVITO, supra note 86, 26–32.
116
Many states have already produced a NAP, such as UK, USA, Italy,
Germany and France, with a full list available at OHCHR, State national action
plans
on
Business
and
Human
Rights
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/NationalActionPlans.aspx.
[https://perma.cc/3FJZ-LNZA] (last visited Nov. 4, 2018).
117 Important: The French Government Published Its National Action Plan for the
Implemenation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, VIGEO EIRIS
(Feb. 5, 2017).
118
Edwin Lopez and Jennifer McKevitt, France Passes Law Requiring Supply
Chain
Due
Diligence,
SUPPLY
CHAIN
DIVE
(Mar.
2,
2017),
http://www.supplychaindive.com/news/France-supply-chain-human-rightsreporting-audits/437191/ [https://perma.cc/Y8AN-QQV2].
119
Sandra Cossart, Jérôme Chaplier, and Tiphaine Beau De Lomenie, The
French Law on Duty of Care: A Historic Step Towards Making Globalization Work for All,
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potential fines of up to ten million euros. Other examples include:
Switzerland’s obligations to Swiss corporations and their
subsidiaries, including imposing a due diligence obligation;120
British companies’ requirement to submit anti-slavery and human
trafficking statements;121 and the unique cooperation in the
Netherlands between the government, local corporations, NGOs,
and employee organizations to create a plan embracing the Guiding
Principles.122
The United States does not have any federal legislation imposing
direct binding duties on human rights issues on corporations and
has mostly relied on the indirect application model of human rights.
However, there are a few proposals and cases that could indicate a
change. First, the June 2000 Corporate Code of Conduct required
any U.S. corporation employing over twenty persons in a foreign
country, either directly or indirectly to ensure the protection of
human rights.123 Second, Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
and Consumer Protection Act requires companies listed on the
American stock exchange (including foreign companies and
subsidiaries) to report any payment made to a foreign government
or to the U.S. government for the purchase of oil, natural gas, or
mineral resources, mainly concerned with associated human rights
violations to these fields.124 Third, the recently revived use of the
Bus. & Hum. Rts. J., 2(2), 317–323 (2017); Bettina Grabmayr, Duty of Care Law: French
Constitutional Council Gives the Green Light, ECOVADIS (Apr. 20, 2017).
120
Elizabeth Umlas, Human Rights Due Diligence: Swiss Civil Society Pushes the
Envelope, BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE (Mar. 13, 2015),
https://business-humanrights.org/en/human-rights-due-diligence-swiss-civilsociety-pushes-the-envelope [https://perma.cc/BJ5B-NPB4].
121
Eric De Brabandere and Maryse Hazelzet, supra note 63, at 1, 2–6, 17.
122 Id., at 18.
123
Corporate Code of Conduct Act of 2000, H.R. 4596, 106th Cong. (2000). The
Act was eventually rejected by the American Congress but shows discusses the
importance of a implement a safe and healthy workplace, ensure fair employment,
including prohibition of the use of child and forced labor, prohibition of
discrimination based upon race, gender, national origin, or religious affiliation,
respect for freedom of association, and the payment of a living wage to all workers
and
additional
duties
related
to
human
rights.
https://www.congress.gov/106/bills/hr4596/BILLS-106hr4596ih.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2C55-39R8].
124
De Brabandere and Maryse, supra note 63, at 16; Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2009–2010).
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Alien Tort Statute (ATS) has been used by U.S. courts to implement
human rights obligations on corporations indirectly, by granting
remedies to foreign citizens for human rights violations committed
outside of the United States.125 U.S. Federal Appellate Courts
remain divided over whether corporations can be sued on the basis
of ATS or whether they are excluded outside the scope of the law.126
3.3. The Way Forward: The Corporation as the Spearhead of the Direct
Application Model
The role of the corporation in modern international society,
specifically the State’s duty to protect its citizens from human rights
violations by the private sector, by taking appropriate steps to
ensure effective remedies upon abuse, and the independent corporate
responsibility to respect human rights, illustrate the justifications and
benefits of the direct application model of human rights in the
private sphere. The basis of the UN Guiding Principles, as
established by John Ruggie and later ratified by numerous
international bodies, provided States with the necessary tools to first
address human rights violations by corporations. Ruggie’s motive
was not to create a binding multilateral treaty, but rather to create a
non-binding international standard that can be modified within
each state as it deemed fit. An example can be seen in the
recommendations for States to adopt a National Action Plan to
address specific human rights issues, as done by numerous states
worldwide. Still, the State’s mission to “protect” its citizens from
human rights violations, accompanied by the State’s obligation to
supply appropriate and effective “remedies” for human rights
breaches, challenge the State to a new legal and constitutional
mindset.
The direct application model focuses on the nature of the
democratic regime, and the duties of the State itself, under the social
125
Alien Tort Statute 28 U.S. Code § 1350; De Brabandere and Maryse, supra
note 63, at 9–12; BERNAZ, supra note 62, 260–284.
126 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). See also Jesner v. Arab Bank 137
S. Ct. 1432 (2017) (currently pending in the United States Supreme Court); Adam
Liptak, Supreme Court to Weigh if Firms Can Be Sued in Human Rights Cases Image,
N.Y.
Times
(Apr.
3,
2017)
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/us/politics/supreme-court-humanrights-arab-bank-terrorism.html?mcubz=0&_r=0
[https://perma.cc/B3CUUKWN].
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contract, to protect its citizens or their basic liberties from others and
to take appropriate steps, i.e., remedies, to punish and redress
business-related human rights abuses when they occur. The
democratic regime with the State is the only player that can
effectively solve conflicts between individuals and guide them to
uphold two major concepts essential to democracy—protecting
human dignity and providing fair arrangements for its protection.
Using the constitution, the direct application model provides an
effective arrangement that allows the legal system and individuals
to safeguard human dignity. As opposed to the indirect application
model, albeit which is more commonly used but through a series of
sophisticated “legal acrobatics,” preventing the justice system to
easily protect its citizens from human rights violations by the private
sector, the direct model provides incentive for corporations to respect
human rights as a whole and provide a direct system of remedies that
simplifies the process for individuals to create human rights claims
directly against corporations as opposed to the indirect application
model.127
Each State implements the direct application model differently.
Some States, such as South Africa, have already applied the direct
application of human rights to the private sector using the state
constitution. Others have revived indirect legal techniques and old
legislation to find procedural and fundamental loopholes that allow
states to apply human rights to the private sector, as was recently
done with the Alien Tort Statute.128 Regardless, it seems that the
acceptable law, and even the appropriate law, shows trends toward
subjugating corporations to the constitutional human rights
obligations. Moreover, the direct application model provides this
trend with the necessary expressive recognition in today’s corporate
and democratic reality.

127 Cf. Protect to Principles 2, 3, 7 and 8 of the UN Guiding Principles, respect
to Principles 11-15 and remedies to Principles 25 and 26. For a possible tool,
representing the indirect method of applying human rights on the corporate
directors and officers, see Cynthia A. Williams and John M. Conley, Is There an
Emerging Fiduciary Duty to Consider Human Rights? 74 UNIV. OF CINCINNATI L. REV.
75 (2005).
128 See Weiss, supra note 83 at 67 (discussing Israel); Ratner, supra note 84 at p.
498.
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4. CONCLUSION
This article discusses the direct application of human rights in
the realm of private law. In many legal systems constitutional
human rights are part of public law and their application to private
law through an indirect application model is limited, implicit, and
unsystematic.
This article holds that this mechanism challenges the
implementation of a democratic worldview, which recognizes not
only a basic individual right to realize human liberties, but also, the
need to protect the possibility of realizing these rights. Accordingly,
the article holds that the state must be involved in protecting citizens
from any violation of their rights, both in public and private spheres,
especially in context of the modern corporation.
However, the prevalent distinction concerning the identity of
the breaching entity creates two ostensibly separate constitutional
systems, all within one single regime drawing its power from
systematic and coherent basic principles.
Furthermore, this
distinction engages in legal “acrobatics” through its use of creative
legal techniques, such as the “State Action” doctrine, or blurred
valve concepts such as the “good faith” and “public policy”
principles.
We contend that democratic regimes need not
“camouflage” their actions, rather openly rely on a direct
application model.
Moreover, the direct application of human rights in private law
actually realizes the constitution’s goals as required by a democratic
legal system, without any dependence on the identity of the
infringing entity, whether it is public or private.
Some hold that adopting the direct application model in private
law may lead to the violation of human rights, given that private law
lacks the necessary tools to balance rights. As we argue and show
at length, this fear is unrealistic. The discussion on individual rights,
including in public law, unfolds within the context of balancing
rights, which is struck regardless of whether human rights are
applied directly or indirectly.
Recent trends show that corporations hold increasing social
responsibility, due to their incredible financial and political power
in key areas that were once dominated by public entities. As the
social responsibility of the private sector grows, so too does its
responsibility. It is not surprising that international discourse and
state action following the 2011 UN Guiding Principles advocates
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that states enforce the newly acquired responsibility, and the direct
application model is closely connected to this mission as well as its
mission to enable more efficient and accessible remedies for
corporate human rights breaches.
Moreover, the comparative review of the status of human rights
in private law indicates that even though most legal systems refrain
from formally defining the application model as direct, human
rights have become increasingly significant in the context of private
law as if the direct application model is almost here. The suggested
approach is not meant to blur the current trends and distinctions
between public and private law but to add additional justifications
to applying human rights in private law.
To conclude, this article holds that the direct application model
is not only justified by deep democratic ideals and the current
international discourse, but can also serve as the most expressive,
effective, and pertinent manner to ensure the implementation of
basic rights; it is essential to democracies and their legal systems to
challenge their current “constitutional mindset.” A modern
corporations’ legal obligation to respect human rights embodied in
the liberal constitutions is a crucial component for a democratic and
humane society, and the direct application model—with its
expressive and legal significance—is a natural step in the right
direction.
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